

Who Does Voter ID Keep from Voting?*

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Abstract

Voter identification laws have expanded over the last decade, sparking concerns of vote suppression. However, existing evidence relies on state-level aggregate analyses or survey self-reports. Here we leverage unique information from Texas, where registrants without identification completed a “Reasonable Impediment Declaration” (RID) before voting. Linking the 16,000 individual-level RID forms to the Texas voter-file, we provide the first direct documentation of who would be turned away from the polls under strict identification laws. Our pre-registered analyses find registrants voting without ID in 2016 were 14 percentage points less likely to vote in the previous, strict ID election than those with ID, and that voters without ID were disproportionately Black and Latinx. Probing mechanisms that produce these effects, we examine voters’ stated reasons for not providing ID and find socioeconomic hardships are not the most commonly cited impediment.

Word Count

11,132

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1 Introduction

States exercise a great deal of control over their voting laws, resulting in substantial cross-state variation in voters' experiences on Election Day. In the wake of the contested 2000 presidential election, the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA), and the Supreme Court's decision in *Shelby County v. Holder* (570 U.S. 529 (2013)), there has been a flurry of activity as states modify their election regulations. Some of the most controversial policies adopted by states are "voter ID" laws, which require poll workers to request photo identification (ID) from registered voters. The recent trend in voter ID laws has been toward "strict" policies, which mandate that in-person voters cannot cast a regular ballot without first presenting a photo ID from a pre-defined list. Such laws are controversial because some otherwise-eligible voters may not have a qualifying ID, and thus could be considered "disenfranchised" or "suppressed" by voter ID laws.

The groups often assumed to be least likely to possess correct identification, such as young, black, Latinx, less-frequent, or less-affluent voters, also tend to be more likely to support the Democratic Party. As such, the debate over voter ID has taken on a partisan hue, and has attracted attention from policy influencers and scholars seeking to determine whether the laws prevent individuals from voting and if so, whether their impact disproportionately burdens voters from certain groups. While journalists and advocates strongly assert both of these claims (Wang 2012; Weiser 2014; Berman 2015), the broader body of academic work appears less certain (Ansolabehere 2009; Erikson and Minnite 2009; Barreto, Nuño and Sanchez 2009; Barreto et al. 2018; Rocha and Matsubayashi 2014; Highton 2017; Hajnal, Lajevardi and Nielson 2017; Grimmer et al. 2018; Hajnal, Kuk and Lajevardi 2018; Burden 2018).

In this paper we leverage a unique change in a state's voter identification statute to examine the impact of voter identification mandates. While Texas implemented a strict voter identification law in the 2014 election, an August 2016 federal court decision allowed Texans without qualifying identification to vote in the 2016 election. These voters

were required to submit a paper declaration listing the reason they lacked ID. We link the information from these records to entries in the Texas voter file, extracting turnout data and address information that allows us to model individual race/ethnicity. Using this information, we are able to study the characteristics and geographic distribution of the more than 16,000 Texans who arrived at polling places without proper identification—and who would have been turned away under the previous strict identification policy. Thus, we move beyond studies relying on estimates of who could be deterred, aggregate turnout statistics, and survey self-reports.

Evaluating differences between the population voting with ID and the population voting without ID, we find significant differences that point to deleterious effects of voter identification laws for particular subsets of the population. Our pre-registered analyses document that registrants voting without ID in 2016 were 14 percentage points less likely to vote in the 2014 election, when a strict ID mandate was in place, and are significantly more likely to be Black and Latinx than the population voting with ID in 2016. Evaluating the mechanisms that produce these effects, we find that the most commonly cited reason for not providing identification is not related to socioeconomic hardships: instead, most voters who voted without ID possessed photo identification but did not have qualifying identification on election day. We also examine county-level factors predicting RID filing rates, determining that Democrats may be disproportionately likely to vote without ID but no evidence that racial disparities are a product of variation in incentives that encourage RID filing. Taken together, our analyses support the notion that strict voter identification laws prevent otherwise eligible individuals from voting, and that such laws have disproportionately negative impacts on minority citizens.

2 Changing Voter ID Mandates

Though they have become more common of late, voter identification laws are not a new idea; they date to as early as 1950, when South Carolina enacted an (non-photo) identification requirement, and at least four other states followed suit during the next thirty years (Biggers and Hanmer 2017). Most of the states that enhanced identification requirements during this time began requiring non-photo identification, but in the mid-2000s, Indiana and Georgia went further. Both states' 2005 laws required voters to present photo identification issued by the state or federal government, with Indiana mandating that all in-person voters show identification starting with the 2006 elections and Georgia implementing the law in 2008. While opponents argued that the laws would create an undue burden on voting for some people, especially minority, low-income, and older voters, the United States Supreme Court upheld Indiana's law in *Crawford v. Marion County Election Board* (553 U.S. 181 (2008)), ruling that Indiana's interest in preventing electoral malfeasance outweighed those burdens.

The *Crawford* decision paved the way for other states to implement strict voter ID laws, with Texas among them. Texas passed its first non-photo ID legislation in 1966 (Biggers and Hanmer 2017), but until the early 2010s, the requirements to cast a ballot in Texas were typical of many states: voters could present a range of identification at the polls, including non-photo IDs. In 2011 however, Texas enacted Senate Bill 14 (Election Code §63.001 et seq., hereafter SB 14), mandating that voters present photo identification before being allowed to cast a ballot. At the time of its passage, SB 14 made Texas' requirements among the strictest in the nation, designating only three types each of acceptable federal and Texas-issued IDs.¹ For example, unlike most other states, student

¹Acceptable identification includes: U.S. military ID, U.S. passport, U.S. citizenship certificate, Texas election identification certificate, Texas ID or driver's license, Texas license to carry a concealed handgun.

identification cards issued by public colleges and universities do not qualify as identification. Under the law, the voter's identification must include a photo, and cannot be expired for more than sixty days. The small number of acceptable IDs meant that Texas' law had the potential to impede voting for an especially large number of Texans. Indeed, as of 2014, more than 600,000 registered voters in Texas lacked adequate identification under SB 14 ([Malewitz 2016b](#)).

SB 14 was initially blocked by the Department of Justice under the pre-clearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), but was implemented hours after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the VRA's coverage formula in *Shelby County v. Holder*.² Immediately thereafter, SB 14 was challenged in federal court as discriminatory under Section 2 of the VRA, continuing a protracted battle over the ID provision in what became known as the *Veasey v. Perry* case. In October 2014, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals temporarily blocked a previous District Court ruling striking down the law, and after an emergency petition to the Supreme Court failed, the strict voter identification measure was in place for the 2014 general election. However, in 2015 a three-judge panel in the 5th Circuit affirmed a District Court ruling that the law had a "discriminatory effect." The entire 5th Circuit affirmed this ruling in July of 2016, sending the case back to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, whose job it was to find an interim solution "that disrupts voter identification rules for the 2016 election season as little as possible, yet eliminates the [Voting Rights Act] discriminatory effect violation."

In August of 2016, the District Court crafted such a remedy, ordering that all voters who possessed an ID required by SB 14 must produce it for poll workers in order to vote in the November election.³ However, the court mandated that voters who lacked identifi-

²570 U.S. 2 (2013)

³The order also expanded the universe of permissible IDs, by ordering Texas to accept identification that had been expired for up to four years, as opposed to the statutes' sixty day limit.

cation that would satisfy SB 14's requirements should be allowed to vote if they met two conditions: First, voters were ordered to complete and sign a "reasonable impediment declaration" (RID) attesting that they did not possess a valid photo ID, as well as the reason why they could not obtain one in time for the election. The form contained eight check-boxes (described below) allowing voters to report their impediment(s). Second, before obtaining an RID form, voters had to produce some other proof of "supporting identification" from a wider list of sources, including a government document with a voter's address, a utility bill, bank statement, paycheck, or a certified birth certificate.

While SB 14 remained on the books for the November 2016 election, the federal courts had weakened it to a non-strict photo identification requirement by allowing voters lacking the required photo identification to vote — so long as they first swore to the reason why they could not obtain it. However, this change from the 2014 election was not well-advertised by Texas election officials, who spent about one-fifth the sum that the significantly smaller state of Missouri allocated to educate voters about its voter ID law; further, Texas sometimes provided incomplete, unclear, or inaccurate information (Huseman 2017). Indeed, in September 2016, the Department of Justice asked the District Court to order Texas to comply with the interim remedial order, contending the state was using "incorrect and far harsher" language in poll worker training regarding circumstances under which individuals could vote without qualifying photo ID (Malewitz 2016a). Later, as early voting began, Bexar County (San Antonio) was sued by MALDEF for displaying and providing misleading information regarding the change to Voter ID laws (Zielinski 2016). So, while the court ruling made it possible for individuals to vote without qualifying identification, many people therefore likely assumed (or were told) that the strict ID regime was in place when deciding to vote.

3 Previous Research on Voter ID's Effects

In Texas and elsewhere, there is a common narrative that voter identification laws are a new form of “voter suppression” intended to reduce the political power of Democratic-aligned voters (Wang 2012; Weiser 2014; Berman 2015). However, academic work has isolated particular components of voter identification laws in an effort to understand what impact they may have. A solid consensus has emerged regarding disparities in who possesses qualifying forms of identification: non-White citizens are less likely to have ID (Barreto, Nuño and Sanchez 2009; Barreto et al. 2018; Stewart 2013; Highton 2017). The same pattern may be found in Texas, where testimony related to *Veasey v. Perry* revealed that Black and Hispanic registered voters were less likely to be found in the Texas driver’s license database (Ansolabehere 2014; Jones et al. 2017). There is also substantial evidence that state legislators are more likely to advocate for voter identification laws where there is a substantial minority population (Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Biggers and Hanmer 2017), where legislators are less concerned about alienating minority constituents (McKee 2015), or where partisan considerations suggest potential gains for Republicans if voter ID laws demobilize Democrats (Rocha and Matsubayashi 2014; Hicks et al. 2015; Biggers and Hanmer 2017; Highton 2017). Thus, the *possibility* of a disparate impact of such laws is clear.

When it comes to the *actual* impact of these laws on who votes, however, there is less clarity. Analysis conducted soon after Indiana’s strict identification law was upheld indicated that it would be difficult to measure the effect of such laws on turnout (Ansolabehere 2009; Hershey 2009; Mycoff, Wagner and Wilson 2009; Erikson and Minnite 2009; Hood and Bullock 2012). These methodological difficulties have persisted since; in his review piece, Highton (2017) indicates the challenges that exist when examining state-level aggregate data. However, there are theoretical reasons for the apparently limited relationship; for instance, any negative impact on turnout could be matched (or exceeded) via a “backlash effect” as Democrats in particular mobilize in response to what

they perceive as an unjust law (Valentino and Neuner 2017). Civic education efforts in the wake of passage could also mitigate any deleterious effects of voter ID laws (e.g., Citrin, Green and Levy 2014). Or, perhaps disenfranchised voters do not exist in sufficient numbers to affect average turnout rates; in Texas, Jones et al. (2017) found that more than 97% of non-voters in 2016 possessed at least one valid piece of identification.

Other work has refocused attention on the population where effects should be largest: racial/ethnic minority voters (Barreto, Nuño and Sanchez 2009; Barreto et al. 2018; Sobel and Smith 2009). Even before the proposal of contemporary voter identification laws, the bipartisan National Commission on Federal Election Reform indicated that a substantial share of “poor and urban” adults did not have photo identification (NCFER 2001), and subsequent research has reinforced this claim. For instance, citing survey evidence from a number of states, Barreto et al. (2018) find that non-whites are significantly less likely to possess identification compliant with voter ID laws. Dropp (2013), using voter file-derived data, presents tentative evidence of a disproportionate drop in Black turnout versus White turnout in states implementing voter identification laws, a finding mirrored in the GAO’s 2014 analysis of Kansas and Tennessee. Other studies find no disproportionate racial/ethnic turnout changes (Hood and Bullock 2012; Rocha and Matsubayashi 2014).

More recent work by Hajnal, Lajevardi and Nielson (2017) uses survey data and evidence from states enacting voter identification laws more recently to investigate the relationship between implementation of voter identification statutes and the Black-White and Latinx-White turnout gaps, finding racial/ethnic disparities in turnout grow when strict ID laws are implemented. That said, Grimmer et al. (2018) contest these findings, which underscores that debates regarding the impact of voter ID laws are ongoing (Hajnal, Kuk and Lajevardi 2018). As Burden (2018) indicates, challenges to estimating effects with cross-state comparisons may be difficult to overcome. Indeed, with their failed replication of Hajnal, Lajevardi and Nielson (2017), Grimmer et al. (2018) note, “national

surveys are ill-suited for estimating the effect of state election laws on voter turnout,” and “researchers should turn to data that allow more precision than surveys offer.”

The District Court’s ruling, while crafted to weaken the strict photo identification requirement in SB 14, also yields a source of such data that allows us to resolve key questions regarding the impact of voter identification laws. While two studies have attempted to analyze voter turnout effects as a function of lack of identification (Hood and Bullock 2012; Hopkins et al. 2017), and Mayer and DeCrescenzo (2018) examines lack of identification as an excuse among non-voters, it has heretofore been impossible to observe a population that actually arrives at the polls and would be turned away under a strict identification regime. However, in mandating that individuals who arrive at the polls without qualifying identification sign a Reasonable Impediment Declaration (RID), the ruling creates a unique opportunity to observe a population that would have been turned away from the polls in the absence of the eleventh-hour District Court order.⁴

The RIDs include voters’ names and in many cases other identifying information, as well as the reason(s) they cited for not having appropriate identification on Election Day. Merged with other data sources, these records therefore facilitate unprecedented insight into the demographics and previous voting behavior of Texas voters lacking ID in 2016,

⁴Under most strict voter identification statutes, voters arriving at the polling place without qualifying identification are permitted to cast a *provisional* ballot. These ballots are only counted if individuals provide qualifying identification within a narrow time frame after Election Day. However, there is substantial discretion in the manner by which election administrators advertise or advocate for this opportunity. Furthermore, evidence suggests that more than 75% of individuals casting provisional ballots for lack of qualifying ID do not complete the follow up process (Pitts 2013). For these reasons, we do not consider the availability of provisional ballots to be equivalent to the regular ballots that can be cast without ID in the absence of a strict identification law or under Texas’s SB 14.

while avoiding the documented problems associated with survey data in this area. Notably, [Henninger, Meredith and Morse \(2018\)](#) employs a similar strategy to the one we use in this paper, exploiting Michigan’s non-strict voter ID law that requires voters lacking identification to sign an affidavit. They find that a very small minority (0.6%) of Michigan voters lack identification, but also that non-white voters were between 2.5 and 6 times more likely than whites to arrive at the polls without qualifying ID.

We believe that administrative records may allow researchers to better understand the impact of voter ID laws. While previous analyses make important progress, the particulars of Texas’ voter ID implementation allow us to go even further. Similar to [Henninger, Meredith and Morse \(2018\)](#), we can match RID-filers to voter records and other databases to compare their demographics to voters who presented identification. Yet, because Texas’s SB 14 was fully implemented during the 2014 election, we can also examine whether a group known to lack identification in one election was less likely to vote when a strict voter ID law was in effect. Finally, because the District Court ordered voters to state the reason they lacked ID, we can include a descriptive element in our analysis. In short, the RID data allow us to engage important, largely unanswered questions of paramount importance to assessing the impact of strict voter ID laws: Who does voter ID legislation keep from voting, and why?

4 Data

Shortly after the 2016 election, we obtained copies of each Reasonable Impediment Declaration that voters completed via requests made under the Texas Public Information Act. In total, we received 16,097 unique RID forms, which were organized by county. An example of the most common RID form may be found in [Figure 1](#).⁵ The upper portion of

⁵There is some variation in the RID forms used in 2016, but more than 90% of RID forms were as depicted here or translated into Spanish, Vietnamese, or Chinese. For

each RID provides a space for the voter to print and sign her name, indicate the date, a brief statement indicating that the voter faces a “reasonable impediment or difficulty that prevents [her] from getting an acceptable form of identification,” and a series of check boxes allowing the voter to claim one of eight reasons for lacking proper identification. Listed reasons include: lacking necessary documents, having a disability, family or work obligations, lack of transportation, having a lost or stolen ID, having applied for an ID that was not yet received, or some other reason. Voters marking the “other” category were invited to write their own justification.⁶ The RIDs also include a lower section completed by the election judge, which captures the precinct location, the name of the certifying election judge, and what alternate form of identification the voter brought.

As Figure 1 indicates, RIDs were completed at the polling place with much of the information hand-written. Given that our interest is in understanding the characteristics of voters arriving at the polls without identification, we endeavored to record all available information on each RID form. The authors and a team of research assistants hand-coded each RID form, entering the name, impediment, date, judge, precinct, and all other information into a spreadsheet with one entry per RID form. Occasionally, additional information was provided on the RID form, either because the form included the voter’s (hand-written) Texas Voter Unique Identifier (VUID) number, or because a pollbook-generated sticker was placed on the form providing full name, address, and/or VUID. All of this information was hand-coded into the aforementioned spreadsheet.⁷

Maverick County, we were also provided with 133 forms that combined a RID with an absentee ballot in-person submission form. We have not included these forms in the analysis below, as these absentee ballot submissions were not included for other counties. Five additional non-standard RID forms are excluded.

⁶The District Court mandated the reasons listed on the RID form, so these items were consistent across all versions of the form.

⁷In Figure 1, the voter’s last name and signature is hidden. In the forms with which

In February of 2017, we acquired a copy of the current Texas voter registration file from the Secretary of State's office. As part of the request, we also acquired turnout history for each registrant (including canceled registrations) for federal general elections for 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. The Texas voter file contains far more information about each registrant than the RID forms, and given that individuals had to be registered to vote to file an RID, we sought to merge each unique RID form to a unique record in the voter file. 2,297 RID forms included the Texas VUID for the voter (14.3% of RIDs), and could be matched directly into the voter file. For the remaining RIDs, we used a combination of county, first, middle, last name, and suffixes, information about whether the RID was filed on Election Day or in early voting, and any additional information on the form to match RID forms to voter file records. 12,624 RIDs (78.4% of RIDs) matched with precisely one Texas voter file record using this information, and 761 (4.7% of RIDs) matched to multiple records in the voter file.⁸

After merging RID forms with Texas voter file records, we sought to add an additional key demographic variable: voter race/ethnicity. The Texas voter file does include information about whether a registrant has a Spanish surname, but does not differentiate between Whites, African-Americans, and Asian Americans. To do so, we used address, sex, date of birth, and surname information to generate probabilistic estimates of the race of every individual in the Texas voter file. Geocoding each address to the Census Tract level with Open Street Map data, Google Geocoding API data, and FCC block information we were provided, this information was not hidden, though in some counties additional information provided by a pollbook sticker (such as address) was redacted. For approximately 1% of provided RIDs (211), there was no voter name information provided on the form, the signature was not legible, and no other identifying information was provided.

⁸A disproportionate share of these multiple matches have a Spanish surname in the Texas voter file. We discuss how we account for multiply matched individuals below.

tion, we used the `wru` package in R to generate these estimates (Imai and Khanna 2016).⁹ For each individual, we thus gained a probability that the registrant is [non-Hispanic] White, Black, Hispanic/Latinx, Asian, or “Other Race.” Due to difficulties in parsing addresses, and the distinctiveness of some surnames, 0.7% of voters in 2016 do not have race estimates (1.1% of matched RID filers). However, with data for over 8.7 million Texas voters in 2016, we can gain a sense of the racial distribution of the population.

Combining all of the above match types, 15,682 RID forms were matched to Texas voter file records. Excluding the small number of RIDs with no name or other identifying information, 98.7% of RIDs were merged with information from the Texas voter file. Thus, the RID data, merged with the Texas voter file and modeled race/ethnicity, provide a complete picture of the voters who reported a reasonable impediment to their obtaining identification in the 2016 election at the polling place, along with their stated rationale, age, race, gender, and previous voting history.

5 Areas of Inquiry and Estimation Strategy

Prior to conducting the above matching process, we outlined our areas of inquiry and pre-registered key parts of our analysis. We focused on three questions that could be answered with the merged RID data above: *Were RID filers less likely to vote under a strict ID mandate? Are RID filers disproportionately non-White? and What impediments to obtaining identification do voters who can produce ID cite?* Hypotheses and estimation strategies related to these questions were pre-registered with the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) service¹⁰ as research assistants were hand coding the RIDs, but prior to merging RIDs with the Texas voter file.

⁹More details regarding the information used to estimate race are provided in the Online Appendix.

¹⁰EGAP ID #:[redacted] Available at [http://egap.org/registration/\[redacted\]](http://egap.org/registration/[redacted]).

First, we sought to determine whether Texas' strict photo ID law barred individuals who lacked qualifying identification from voting in 2014. Having been implemented in time for the 2014 election, SB 14 was in full effect during that year, before being reduced to a non-strict form by the District Court's injunction allowing voters lacking compliant identification to vote via the RID process in 2016. If Texas' strict voter ID law depresses turnout among voters lacking ID, we should expect that voter turnout in 2014 was lower for 2016 RID filers than for non-RID filers. In this analysis, we restrict registrants to those who were registered on or before October 1, 2014, and were thus eligible to vote in the 2014 election.¹¹

In our pre-analysis plan, we engage this hypothesis with a nonparametric difference-in-differences (DID) model that uses the RID data to identify individuals who voted without qualifying identification in 2016, and then examines whether or not those individuals were less likely to vote in the 2014 election, after accounting for trends in pre-SB 14 turnout propensity at the individual level. The quantity of interest is turnout in the 2014 election, with the key independent variable being whether an individual filed an RID in 2016. Leveraging the large scale of the Texas voter file, we outlined that we would conduct exact matching to gain balance on pre-treatment (that is, pre-2014) patterns of voter turnout across the RID and non-RID groups. There are two important assumptions with this methodology. Specifically, we assume that individuals who voted without qualifying identification in 2016 have similar vote tendency to the population who lacked voter identification in 2014. We cannot observe who lacked identification in 2014, yet would have voted in the absence of the strict law; thus we use voting without identification in 2016 as a proxy for this population. We also assume that accounting for the pre-treatment

¹¹Such a restriction is important, because many RID filers were too young to vote in 2014. This restriction also means that our test is a conservative estimate of the total effect, as first-time registrants in 2016, some of whom may have decided not to register in 2014, are excluded from our analysis.

trend in voter turnout accounts for underlying vote propensity in the absence of a strict voter identification law, and that a parallel trend in turnout would be observed otherwise.

In case the parallel trends assumption does not hold, we also produce estimates with a lagged dependent variable model conducted via a least-squares regression. Such a technique has many of the same bias-reducing features of a difference-in-differences approach, but allows for a more flexible relationship between past voter turnout and turnout post-treatment (O'Neill et al. 2016). Here turnout in the 2014 election is predicted by RID status, controlling for a voter's rate of turnout in the 2012, 2010, and 2008 elections.

To account for the 4.7% of RID filers who matched to multiple records in the Texas voter file, we weight each entry in the voter file with a value of 0 if she was not matched to an RID, 1 if she was a unique match to an RID, and a value inversely proportional to the number of other voter file records to which the single RID matched if she was not a unique match.¹² For example, a voter file entry would have an RID value of 0.5 if it was one of two matches to a single RID, as it has a 50/50 chance of being an RID-filer versus not.

Second, we make a *distributional* comparison, leveraging the individual-level race/ethnicity estimates to determine whether non-White voters in 2016 were disproportionately likely to vote using RIDs. In our pre-analysis plan, we indicated that we would compare the share of the 2016 voting population that is Black, Latinx, and/or Asian—as well as the overall non-White share—without qualifying ID to the share of the 2016 voting population that is Black, Latinx, Asian, and/or non-White with qualifying ID. Guided by previous literature (e.g., (Barreto, Nuño and Sanchez 2009; Barreto et al. 2018; Jones et al. 2017; NCFER 2001; Stewart 2013)), we hypothesize that non-White registered voters are

¹²The existence of multiply matched individuals was not anticipated when outlining the methodology in the pre-analysis plan. See the Appendix for a more extended discussion of this deviation.

less likely to have qualifying identification, and thus will be less likely to present said identification at the polling place; non-Whites should comprise a disproportionate share of RID filers as a result. If Texas' strict voter ID law disproportionately affected racial and/or ethnic minorities, we should therefore observe a higher proportion of non-Whites among RID-filers than among voters overall.¹³

In making this distributional comparison, we do not make assumptions regarding the population that is "discouraged" from attempting to vote or registering to vote for reasons associated with the strict voter identification laws. Instead, we only examine whether non-White individuals are less likely to have qualifying identification when arriving at the polling place in the 2016 Texas general election. However, as we suspect that county noncompliance may not be orthogonal to the racial/ethnic composition of a jurisdiction, we also conduct this test on a subset of the data where counties filed at least one RID petition.¹⁴

Our pre-registered analyses allow us to reevaluate claims made in previous work regarding turnout and the populations most impacted by voter identification laws. However, drawing on the rich dataset provided by the RID filings, we were able to extend our pre-registered analyses and examine the mechanisms that shape the patterns we explored above.

The first exploration of potential mechanisms focuses on the reasons voters give for not providing qualifying identification, an under-explored area of inquiry in previous

¹³As above, for RID filers matched to multiple records in the Texas voter file, we weight each entry in the voter file with a value of 0 if they were not matched to an RID, 1 if they are a unique match to an RID, and a value inversely proportional to the number of other voter file records the single RID matched to if they are not a unique match.

¹⁴Sixty-five counties reported no RIDs. Noncompliance with/ignorance of the court injunction could result in some counties turning away voters who tried to vote without qualifying identification, while others may have not asked for RIDs at all.

research. The policy debate surrounding voter ID laws often centers on lowering hurdles to obtaining compliant identification for the subpopulation of voters who lack it, under the assumption that they have *never* had a photo ID. Another common theme in public debate over voter ID laws is that older and/or less affluent voters, as well as those from minority groups, find it more difficult to obtain identification due to a lack of necessary documents (Horwitz 2016). The RIDs require voters to list the reason why they cannot obtain ID, allowing us to scrutinize the check-boxes on the RIDs, as well as the rationales that voters wrote after choosing the “other” option. We also combine voters into three binned categories: Those who are “ID-capable,” who face an enduring hardship, and who have recently relocated.

As a final step, we evaluate whether county-level factors shape the rate of RID filing among 2016 voters. Using information about the county of the RID filer, we constructed rates of RID filing among all 2016 voters and evaluated how county-level factors affected them. Such an analysis clarifies whether administrative discretion produced differences in rates of RID filing, a mechanism that would imply individual-level correlations could be a product of jurisdiction-level variation in implementation.

6 Results

As noted above, there are three discrete areas of inquiry where the RID data can be useful for clarifying previous work. The first two are pre-registered analyses regarding reduced voter turnout for individuals without ID under strict identification regimes, and a disparate racial impact of voter identification laws on voter turnout. The third area of inquiry concerns the reasons why individuals vote without ID, with relevance to legal claims regarding the breadth of populations that *could* be impacted by voter identification laws. We summarize findings for each of these areas below.

6.1 2016 RID Filers Voted Less in 2014, Compared to Other Years

In Table 1 we document the difference in rates of voting in the 2014 election between those who voted with qualifying identification in 2016 and those voting without qualifying identification in 2016. We begin by providing the raw difference in voter turnout in the 2014 election, labeled as column (1) in Table 1. Here we see a 19.4 percentage point difference in turnout rates in 2014 for those filing RIDs in 2016 versus those who voted without filing an RID. When conducting a non-parametric difference in differences analysis, which was outlined in our pre-analysis plan (PAP) prior to merging the RID information with the Texas Voter File,¹⁵ we see that equalizing turnout in the 2012, 2010, and 2008 elections across RID-filing status still yields a 13.7 percentage point difference in rates of voting in the 2014 election. A similar, lagged dependent variable approach (column 5) produces the same estimate of 13.7 percentage points lower voter turnout in a strict voter identification election for those who voted without ID in 2016 after accounting for turnout in three previous elections.

The above aligns with what we hypothesized in our pre-analysis plan, namely, that RID filers would be significantly less likely to vote in the strict voter identification election (2014) after accounting for turnout in the 2012, 2010, and 2008 elections. However, one may assert that individuals filing RIDs are *generally* infrequent voters: are RID filers especially unlikely to vote in 2014 versus other election years? Rows 2 and 3 of Table 1 examine this possibility, and indeed find that RID filers were between two and nine percentage points less likely to vote in the 2012 and 2010 elections, even after accounting for registration date¹⁶ and turnout in previous elections. However, the magnitude

¹⁵Pre-registered through the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) service, ID #: [redacted], [http://egap.org/registration/\[redacted\]](http://egap.org/registration/[redacted]).

¹⁶These analyses only include individuals registered to vote by October 1, 2012 and October 1, 2010, respectively.

Table 1: Difference in Turnout in Previous Elections, RID Filers vs. Regular Voters

	Raw Difference		Diff-in-Diff		Lagged DV	
	(1)	County FE (2)	(3)	County FE (4)	(5)	County FE (6)
2014	-0.194 [-0.207,-0.182]	-0.194 [-0.206,-0.181]	-0.137 [-0.150,-0.124]	-0.136 [-0.148,-0.123]	-0.137 [-0.148,-0.126]	-0.139 [-0.150,-0.128]
2012	-0.086 [-0.095,-0.076]	-0.077 [-0.087,-0.068]	-0.057 [-0.068,-0.047]	-0.030 [-0.038,-0.022]	-0.058 [-0.067,-0.049]	-0.052 [-0.061,-0.042]
2010	-0.091 [-0.105,-0.077]	-0.082 [-0.096,-0.068]	-0.060 [-0.075,-0.045]	-0.018 [-0.026,-0.010]	-0.061 [-0.075,-0.047]	-0.058 [-0.071,-0.044]

Note: Includes individuals marked as having cast a non-provisional ballot in the Texas voter file for the 2016 election, and were registered to vote in each of the indicated election years. “Raw Difference” indicates the difference in voter turnout rates for RID filers versus 2016 voters who voted with ID. “Diff-in-Diff” is the difference in turnout rates after exact matching RID vs. non-RID voters on turnout in the 2008 election, and any other federal elections prior to the election year examined. “Lagged DV” is the modeled difference in turnout rates when controlling for turnout in the 2008 election, and any other federal elections prior to the election year examined. “County FE” models include fixed effects for county. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets below point estimates.

of this difference is consistently less than half of the size of of the difference we see in the strict identification mandate 2014 election. Columns 2, 4, and 6 also model the difference in voter turnout through a least-squares regression model with fixed effects for voters’ county, which has little effect on the estimates for the 2014 election.

Obviously, not providing qualifying identification in 2016 could not have *caused* a person to not vote in 2014. However, those who voted without ID in 2016 may be similar to, or indeed the same individuals as, those who did not have qualifying identification in the strict voter identification election of 2014. Thus, individuals filing RIDs in the 2016 election are a reasonable proxy for those who may have attempted to vote, but been turned away from the polls in 2014. Such an interpretation is supported by contextual information indicating that most individuals did not intentionally avoid producing ID due to the RID option. As mentioned above, awareness of the court order was (and is) not high and election officials were accused of not devoting enough pre-election resources to advertising the change to the strict voter identification mandate. The analysis of cited impediments below also indicates a very small portion of individuals voting without ID

to “protest” ID mandates, or because they were not aware they needed ID to vote. While we cannot directly measure the population that was deterred from attempting to vote by the strict photo ID law, it is clear that individuals arriving at the polls without ID in 2016 were substantially less likely to vote when the strict regime was in force.

6.2 Non-Whites Are More Likely to Vote Without ID than Whites

The second set of findings concerns the racial/ethnic composition of the population that votes without mandated identification, compared to those that voted with qualifying ID. We term this test a *distribution comparison* in the PAP.

To estimate the racial/ethnic composition of the 2016 voting population that voted with ID versus voting without ID, we summed the probabilities that each voter was of a particular racial/ethnic group (Elliott et al. 2008). In effect, this allows us to account for uncertainty in race/ethnicity estimates, and when combined with uncertainty in who filed an RID for multiply matched records, ensures that our results are not influenced by differences in unique match likelihood across racial/ethnic groups.¹⁷

Table 2 provides estimates of the racial/ethnic composition of the population voting with ID in 2016 (that is, the population that did not file an RID) and the population voting without ID in 2016 (RID filers). Both the percentage and the estimated N for each group of 2016 voters is provided. As the first three columns of Table 2 indicate, the population voting without identification in 2016 was disproportionately Black and Latinx, and substantially less White, when compared with the population voting with ID. We estimate that 63.5% of Texas voters voting with ID were non-Hispanic White in 2016, while

¹⁷For example, Latinx RID filers are disproportionately likely to match to multiple voter file records, and are easier to classify than African-Americans or Whites. Categorical methods of estimating race, or categorical definitions of who filed an RID, could produce an upwardly biased estimate of this population.

Table 2: 2016 Voters by Race and ID Usage

	White	Black	Latinx	Asian	Other
<i>Voted with ID</i>	63.5%	11.4%	19.8%	3.6%	1.7%
<i>N</i>	5,662,757	1,014,706	1,764,490	316,159	153,748
<i>Voted without ID</i>	57.7%	16.1%	20.7%	2.9%	2.6%
<i>N</i>	8,409	2,353	3,014	418	383

Note: Includes individuals marked as having cast a non-provisional ballot in the Texas voter file. “Voted with ID” represents the percentage or number of voters who were not matched to Reasonable Impediment Declarations (RIDs). “Voted without ID” represents the percentage or number of voters who were matched to RIDs. 1.3% of RIDs have not been matched to voter file records, and are thus included in the “Voted with ID” category. Race could not be estimated for 0.7% of 2016 voters. These individuals are excluded from the above totals.

only 57.7% of Texans voting without ID were non-Hispanic White: a difference of 5.8 percentage points. 11.4% of 2016 voters voting with ID were African-American, while over 16% of non-ID voters were African-American. For Latinxs, we see a smaller difference between the RID and non-RID filing population, but again, RID filers are disproportionately Latinx. Asian Americans, on the other hand, are slightly *less* likely to file RIDs than other groups. Finally, individuals labeled as “Other” in the race/ethnicity estimates are a 1 percentage point larger share of the RID-filing population than the non-RID filing population.

In the PAP, we outlined that a two-sample *t*-test would be used to compare the racial/ethnic distribution of RID filers versus 2016 voters who did not file an RID. In independent tests, we indicated that we would examine the Black, Latinx, Asian, and overall non-White share across RID filing status. To do so, we are forced to strictly separate RID filers from non-RID filers, removing the roughly 5% of multiply matched individuals. Tests of statistical significance indicate a *p*-value < 0.001 for African-Americans, Latinxs, and the overall non-White share. For Asian Americans, the *t*-test indicates that Asians are significantly *less* likely to be in the RID-filing group. To incorporate multiply-matched individuals, we instead estimate a linear regression model with our non-binary RID measure, which accounts for uncertainty in who filed an RID. Under this test, all of the differences

in Table 2 are statistically significant.


Previous literature asserts quite strongly that racial/ethnic minority groups are less likely to have qualifying forms of identification in strict voter identification states. Thus, in our pre-analysis plan we hypothesized that the composition of the RID-filing population would be more minority, and less non-Hispanic White, than the non-RID filing population of 2016 voters. Table 2 indicates quite clearly that this is the case, with the strongest difference for African-Americans who are substantially more likely to not provide ID at the polls. Black voters were approximately 54% more likely to vote without identification than non-Hispanic Whites, while Latinx voters were 14% more likely to do so than non-Hispanic Whites. Under a strict voter identification law, such as that in force in Texas in 2014, minority voters would be disproportionately likely to show up to vote, but be turned away at the polls, and thus prevented from participating in an election that they would like to participate in and are eligible to vote in absent the strict ID law.

6.3 Many Voting Without ID Possess ID

We next consider whether voters' traits are associated with specific reasons they cited for lacking qualifying identification, and also whether those reasons are consistent with some of the commonly posited narratives surrounding voter ID laws. As described above, the mandated RID format required eight check-boxes allowing voters to mark the reason they lacked identification. An examination of these responses can therefore be informative in two respects: First, it allows us to assess the veracity of commonly held assumptions about voters who lack ID, and second, studying impediment declarations may allow us to better understand the mechanisms that induce the disparate turnout and racial/ethnic patterns found above. If voter traits are correlated with cited impediments, policy efforts to diminish the deleterious effects of voter ID laws might also be better-calibrated.

Figure 2 depicts the percentage of RID-filers citing each impediment (some voters se-

Figure 2: Impediments Cited by Texas Voters in 2016



lected more than one option). “Family” obligations are the least-cited impediment among Texas voters, with 3.8% of people selecting that reason. Between six and eight percent of voters cited pending application, lack of transportation, problems with necessary documents, and an illness or disability as impeding them from obtaining appropriate identification. About 11.7% of voters cited “work” obligations. Of the categories listed as check-offs on the RID petitions, “lost or stolen” is the most widely chosen, with 27% of voters selecting it. That said, a clear plurality (36%) of voters chose the “other” option, often writing their own explanation for why they lacked identification.¹⁸

The frequency with which voters opted for the “other” category suggests that the potential impediments that the District Court mandated for the RID forms were not all-

¹⁸This pattern holds up fairly well when examined by race; while White, Black, and Latinx voters all selected “other” and “lost” most frequently. See Appendix Figure A1.

encompassing. We therefore further coded the RID petitions into categories based on the explanation that voters wrote in the “other” field on the RID document. The frequencies of those responses appear in Table 3.¹⁹ The clear leader among these responses was a change of address that had not yet been reflected on the voter’s ID. RIDs that explicitly mentioned a recent move comprised a majority of the voters (nearly 3,000) marking the “other” option on the RID form; an additional 338 voters explicitly mentioned their relocation-related status as students.²⁰ More than 650 voters said that while they possessed identification, they had left it elsewhere on Election Day. About 230 voters presented a non-compliant identification (such as an expired driver’s license), while an additional 101 cited legal issues such as a suspended driver’s license. Finally, it is worth noting that the explanations of about one-fifth of these voters did not offer further insight into the impediment they faced.²¹

In tandem with the marked check-boxes, the re-coded “other” responses can be placed in bins to shed additional light on the broad reasons voters cited for lacking acceptable identification. For instance, we can gain a sense of voters who are “ID-Capable”—those who have demonstrated a previous ability to obtain identification—by binning those who said they had either lost or forgotten their ID or were refusing to show it in order to protest SB 14. We can also identify voters with a relocation-related problem by combining voters who referenced a student status, a recent move, or awaiting new identification after

¹⁹These responses were human-coded. When voters marked “other” and then described a reason consistent with one of the check-box categories—such as an illness—we recoded “other” as zero and reassigned the voter to the appropriate category.

²⁰It is often difficult from the RIDs to discern why a voter has recently moved. While students broadly fit in the “relocation” category, we placed voters in the “student” category if they referenced their status as a student on the RID.

²¹For instance, many voters simply reiterated that they did not have identification, rather than stating why they lacked it.

Table 3: Coded Responses from Written Descriptions of Voters Selecting “Other” Option

	Count	Percent
Recent Relocation	2,971	51.2%
Other/Unclear	1,236	21.3%
Forgot ID	658	11.4%
Student	338	5.8%
Presented Non-Compliant ID	232	4.0%
Legal Issues	101	1.7%
Cost	81	1.4%
Lack of Time	70	1.2%
Protesting Law	46	0.8%
Administrative Decision	41	0.7%
Ignorance of Law	23	0.4%
Religious Objection	2	0.03%


applying for it. We classify all other RID-filers (except for those for whom the reason was unclear) as having some kind of enduring hardship that impedes them from acquiring acceptable identification.

We depict the percentage of RID-filers falling into each of these bins in Figure 3. For more than 33% of RID-filers, the impediment appeared to be an enduring hardship. This is consistent with much of the popular conversation surrounding voter ID laws, which often assumes that lacking identification is a longstanding and difficult-to-overcome condition. However, Figure 3 also shows that more than 5,000 voters—whose petitions comprised more than 31% of all RIDs—could be classified as being ID-capable.²² Furthermore, about 29% of voters had recently relocated, so their identification did not list the correct address. If we assume that voters who cited a recent move had obtained iden-

²²The same relative ranking is observed for Black and White voters when responses examined by race. Latinx voters were less likely to report a relocation, and more likely to fall into the ID-Capable category. A multivariate regression analysis also indicates that Black and Latinx RID filers were less likely to cite a relocation-related impediment, and more likely to be in the ID-Capable category after accounting for age and gender. See the Online Appendix for more details.

tification while living at their prior address, a combination of the “relocation” and “ID-Capable” categories in Figure 3 suggests that it is likely that a majority of voters who filed RIDs in 2016 at one time had demonstrated the capability to obtain compliant identification.

Figure 3: Binned Impediments Cited



Non-hardship individuals are not usually included when calculating how many persons are impacted by strict ID laws; this is especially true for those who have previously had identification (i.e., those in the “ID-Capable” category). Our results therefore suggest that the reasons people have for lacking identification might be more varied than we tend to think, which also implies that some voters are more susceptible to enduring disenfranchisement as a result of voter ID laws than others. This begs a question: Do we see the same patterns of lower participation in the strict-ID 2014 election that we report in Table 1 for those not indicating a hardship-related impediment?

The models in Table 4 replicate the lagged dependent variable models found in Table 1, while separating RID filers by the binned impediment they listed. Across all groups, we see substantially lower turnout in the preceding strict ID election. Turnout in 2010

and 2012 is also lower for RID filers regardless of impediment, but in no circumstance is the decrease in turnout as large as in 2014. Thus, regardless of the impediment listed, turnout for RID filers was significantly lower in a strict ID election than in other years.

Table 4: Difference in Turnout, RID Filers vs. Regular Voters by Impediment Type

	All RID Filers		Hardship Only		Relocation Only		ID Capable Only	
	(1)	County FE (2)	(3)	County FE (4)	(5)	County FE (6)	(7)	County FE (8)
2014	-0.137	-0.139	-0.189	-0.192	-0.177	-0.182	-0.095	-0.094
	[-0.148,-0.126]	[-0.15,-0.128]	[-0.209,-0.169]	[-0.212,-0.172]	[-0.209,-0.145]	[-0.215,-0.15]	[-0.11,-0.079]	[-0.11,-0.079]
2012	-0.058	-0.051	-0.075	-0.068	-0.086	-0.082	-0.043	-0.036
	[-0.067,-0.049]	[-0.061,-0.042]	[-0.091,-0.058]	[-0.085,-0.052]	[-0.115,-0.057]	[-0.11,-0.053]	[-0.056,-0.031]	[-0.048,-0.023]
2010	-0.061	-0.058	-0.054	-0.051	-0.107	-0.104	-0.061	-0.059
	[-0.075,-0.047]	[-0.071,-0.044]	[-0.079,-0.029]	[-0.075,-0.026]	[-0.152,-0.062]	[-0.147,-0.06]	[-0.08,-0.043]	[-0.077,-0.041]

Note: Includes individuals marked as having cast a non-provisional ballot in the Texas voter file for the 2016 election, and were registered to vote in each of the indicated election years. “Hardship Only” compares RID filers who listed a hardship as their impediment to non-RID voters. “Relocation Only” compares RID filers who indicated a relocation impediment to non-RID voters. “ID-Capable Only” compares RID filers who have demonstrated a previous ability to obtain identification to non-RID voters. All models use the “Lagged DV” specification as described in Table 1. “County FE” models include fixed effects for county. 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets below point estimates.

Yet in theory, individuals indicating a hardship—such as lacking necessary documents or work obligations—should be even *less* likely to vote in 2014 than those who may have temporarily lacked identification. Such an understanding is confirmed in Table 4, where RID filers listing a hardship were 19 percentage points less likely to vote, versus ID-capable RID filers who were only 9 percentage points less likely to vote in 2014 as compared to non-RID filers. Individuals who stated that they relocated recently, yet were registered to vote in Texas in previous elections, look more similar to hardship RID voters. However, it is difficult to make firm conclusions about the mechanisms at work for this population, as their turnout is also substantially lower than other RID filers in the 2010, non-strict ID election.

Especially considering the results in Table 4, the fact that many RID-filers had previously demonstrated a capacity to obtain identification might be taken as evidence that voter ID laws are not all that burdensome. However, we believe this conclusion should be weighed against three other facts. First, regardless of their reason for lacking appropriate

identification, all 16,000 voters who filed RIDs would likely have been disenfranchised in the absence of federal court intervention. Second, our tabulation implies that examining state ID databases in an effort to identify the voters likely to be disenfranchised—as is commonly done in litigation surrounding voter ID laws (e.g., [Ansolabehere and Hersh 2017](#))—might still not capture the true impact of these policies, because it will fail to count as disenfranchised the voters who have obtained state identification that cannot be presented for voting purposes. Third, about one-third of RID filers *do* appear to have a hardship posing a meaningful impediment to obtaining ID that would affect their ability to vote in future elections.

6.4 County-Level Factors Do Not Appear to Explain Our Findings

As is the case in most states, county officials in Texas enjoy considerable discretion when it comes to election administration. As such, it is possible that election officials in counties with larger minority populations—who may have believed that their voters were particularly likely to lack compliant identification—were more actively communicating the possibility that voters could file RIDs. If so, this might have increased the probability that a given minority voter filed a petition relative to a given white voter, which could affect the conclusions we report above with respect to the disproportionately non-white demographics of the voters who filed RIDs. We therefore conclude by considering the possibility that our results could be spuriously driven by county-level factors.

Table 5 contains OLS regression coefficients and robust standard errors for models of the percentage of voters casting ballots in 2016 who filed RIDs in a given county.²³ We fit models of the overall county RID percentage, the percentage of voters filing RIDs

²³The dependent variable is a percentage ranging from 0 to 1. Results of these models are generally consistent with models using data only from counties filing at least one RID, which we fit to determine whether disparate implementation affects the models in Table 5. Those models can be found in Appendix Table A6.

for reasons relating to a relocation or hardship, and the rate of ID-capable RID filers. These models clarify whether county-level attributes affected the county’s rate of RIDs that were filed out of all ballots cast, and also whether those same attributes were related to rates of RIDs binned in the three categories we describe above: relocation, ID-capable, and hardship.

Table 5: Determinants of County-Level RID Rates

	Overall Rate	Relocation Rate	I.D.-Capable Rate	Hardship Rate
Perc. Obama, 2012	0.44* (0.12)	0.05* (0.03)	0.23* (0.08)	0.10* (0.04)
Perc. Black	-0.50* (0.20)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.28* (0.12)	-0.12* (0.05)
Perc. Latinx	-0.19* (0.06)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.05* (0.02)
Perc. No College	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.12* (0.04)	0.14* (0.06)	-0.07 (0.04)
Perc. Aged 18-24	0.87* (0.37)	0.35* (0.17)	0.28 (0.15)	0.27* (0.09)
Perc. Aged 75+	-0.07 (0.56)	0.10 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.23)	0.15 (0.22)
Constant	0.05 (0.11)	0.08* (0.04)	-0.11 (0.06)	0.06 (0.04)
Number of Observations	254	254	254	254
R ²	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.10
F-Statistic	5.11	3.57	2.41	6.17
Root Mean Sq. Error	0.13	0.04	0.07	0.05

Note: * = $p < 0.05$. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The rate for counties filing no RIDs is set to zero. Demographic information from U.S. Census 2015 5-year ACS estimates. "Perc. Obama" is Barack Obama’s share of the county-level two-party vote. Voters who had “relocated” are those who marked the “Other” category and noted a recent move and/or student status. Voters who are “ID-capable” are those who claimed to have lost an ID, as well as those who chose “other” and wrote that they had forgotten their ID or were protesting the law. All other voters fall into the “hardship” category.

There are several trends worth noting. First, all models in Table 5 indicate that the percentage of the two-party vote that Barack Obama received in a given county during the 2012 election is positively, meaningfully, and significantly associated with the percentage of people whom SB 14 would have deterred from voting. Thus, the county-level models offer evidence that SB 14 may be disproportionately burdensome in Democratic-leaning counties. That said, the filing rate does not appear to rise as a result of higher concentrations of two core Democratic constituencies in a given county: Black and Latinx voters. Indeed, the coefficients for the percentage of both African-American and Latinx residents are *negatively* signed in all models and achieve statistical significance in all but one. That said, counties with a large proportion of very *young* voters (another traditionally Democratic-leaning group) do see more voters reporting an impediment. The burden on young voters (those aged 18 to 24) appears to accrue especially in the “relocation” and “hardship” categories.

The models in Table 5 yield further evidence that the results we describe above should be taken as a lower-bound estimate of the number of voters disenfranchised by SB 14. Specifically, in Table 2 we showed that at the individual level, people who voted without an ID were significantly less white than those who voted with compliant identification. However, this individual-level result is apparent despite the fact that a higher proportion of minority voters is associated with *lower* rates of RID filing at the county level. Put another way, the county-level results in Table 5 could be indicative of a kind of backlash effect (e.g., [Valentino and Neuner 2017](#)) whereby groups made targeted efforts to help voters lacking identification to obtain it before the election—or some other unknown trend. Even so, our individual-level results suggest that minorities were more likely to lack compliant identification in the 2016 election, and would therefore have been more likely to be turned away from the polling place absent the federal court order mandating the usage of reasonable impediment declarations.

Returning to the potential mechanisms that induce voting without identification, these

county-level results also appear to discount the possibility that differential enforcement of the RID mandate produces the racial/ethnic differences found in Table 2. A plausible mechanism for producing this effect is that heavily-minority counties may be the types of places where minority advocacy groups, co-ethnic election officials, or campaigns put extra effort into advertising the availability of the RID option. However, we see the opposite relationship at the county level. Thus, the individual-level patterns we find are not likely to be a product of mechanisms relating to selective advertising of the RID option.

7 Conclusion

The past decade has seen an expansion of voting law changes perhaps unprecedented since implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Strict voter identification laws have been among the most controversial, due to their potential to disenfranchise voters who lack the necessary photo identification. Yet, data with which we can answer the question of whether strict voter ID laws actually *do* have disenfranchising effects—and then, whether these effects disproportionately impact some voters more than others—have been difficult to acquire. Particularly when it comes to understanding subgroup effects, survey data have proven to be a suboptimal platform by which to examine the effects of state laws on individual behavior ([Ansolabehere, Luks and Schaffner 2015](#); [Grimmer et al. 2018](#); [Stoker and Bowers 2002](#)), which creates a need for other individual-level data by which to study the effects of voter ID laws.

A District Court ruling in Texas created an invaluable source of such data. In mandating that Texas allow voters lacking identification to vote—so long as they declared the reason that they could not produce adequate ID—the court’s remedy indirectly yielded a data set containing identifiable information from more than 16,000 Texans who arrived at polling places in 2016, but who would have been turned away had SB 14 been in full effect. The main purpose of our study was to examine these records in an effort to deter-

mine whether strict voter identification laws are likely to prevent some individuals from voting, and whether those voting without qualifying identification are disproportionately minority. We also examine patterns in the reasons voters cited for lacking ID, indicating the mechanisms that induce individuals to file RIDs when voting and providing additional context for policy debates in this area.

We find strong evidence that individuals voting without identification in 2016 were differentially less likely to vote in 2014 (when the strict voter ID requirement was in place) as compared to other election years. These effects are strongest for voters who report the existence of an enduring hardship that impedes them from obtaining compliant identification. So while individuals voting without ID are less frequent voters, the evidence presented here indicates that strict voter identification laws make these individuals even less likely to vote. Coinciding with implied findings from ([Hood and Bullock 2012](#)), we conclude that voter identification laws do reduce turnout among a population that does not have qualifying identification.

We also determine that the population voting without identification was disproportionately Black and Latinx, and overall less White than the population of 2016 voters who provided qualifying ID. Buttressing work that indicates a disparate racial impact of voter identification laws, we find significant differences in the racial/ethnic composition of the population that shows up at the polls without identification versus those meeting strict ID mandates. Such a finding has important implications for ongoing investigations of Texas's voting practices, especially its potential violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. County-level factors do not explain these differential racial impacts, implying that differences in implementation do not explain the racial/ethnic effects we find. More broadly, the fact that racial/ethnic minority groups would be disproportionately turned away from the polls under the strictest forms of voter identification laws suggests the need to soften such laws if all Americans are to have equal access to the ballot.

The court's ruling also creates a new data source that allows us not only to identify

and count voters who arrived at the polls without proper identification in 2016, but also to gain an understanding of *why* they could not produce ID. Going beyond survey reports that indicate what share of non-voters claim lack of identification as an impediment to voting, we find direct evidence that a majority of the individuals who showed up to the polls without qualifying ID in 2016 had demonstrated the capability to obtain qualifying identification at some point in the recent past, or were actively trying to acquire it. This suggests that estimates of the population impacted by ID laws relying on measures of the population *without* ID, such as those relying on matching to driver's license databases, are likely underestimating the pool of potential individuals who would be turned away under the strictest forms of identification laws.

While this study provides evidence regarding the impact of ID laws in at least three domains, it is important to recognize the limitations inherent in our study. First among these is the fact that our study relies on individuals deciding to *try* to cast a ballot. The RIDs do not provide a total measure of how many voters SB 14 and the softened ID requirements deterred from voting, as they do not capture information from voters who simply never tried to vote at all. Relatedly, our test for disparate impacts of voter identification laws is inherently strict. Individuals who had awareness of the law, perhaps from experience voting in 2014, may have shifted their behavior and produced identification for the 2016 election when they would otherwise have not done so. It is therefore plausible that the findings in this paper underestimate the true effect of voter identification laws, or underestimate racial/ethnic disparities produce by said laws. Finally, our analysis is of a single state and a single election instance where circumstances allowed us to view who votes without identification. While providing valuable information about the population disenfranchised by strict ID laws, the legacy of minority voting rights in Texas is somewhat unique and therefore SB 14 may have a disproportionately negative impact on voters relative to other states.

Texas is the largest and most diverse state to put in place a voter identification law

of any sort. Implementation of the strictest form of Texas’s law continues to be the subject of legal action, and in 2017 Texas enacted a new voter ID law, which includes an RID provision (though that provision is stricter than the standard crafted by the District Court’s 2016 interim order). Variation induced by both the legal and lawmaking processes provides a unique opportunity to understand the impact of voter identification laws on infrequent voters and racial/ethnic minority voters more broadly. We find substantial evidence that strict voter identification laws impede voting for otherwise eligible citizens, many of whom are only temporarily unable to produce qualifying identification, and a disproportionate share of which belong to historically disadvantaged groups. While debates may continue regarding the magnitude of negative impacts resulting from voter ID laws, our evidence clearly indicates that a negative impact exists and further diminishes the political voice of those already less likely to participate in politics.

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Online Appendix

Deviation from Pre-Analysis Plan

In the course of completing the project we discovered two methodological challenges leading to deviations from the pre-analysis plan. The most substantial deviation was produced by the unforeseen issue of individual RID forms matching to multiple persons in the Texas voter file. As a result, the difference-in-differences analysis in the main text is conducted on a subset of individuals who matched 1:1 with a single record in the voter file. This is because the matching procedure employed demands a dichotomous treatment status, and we have a measurable amount of uncertainty for which voter file entry approximately 5% of RID forms matches to. Any RID records matching multiple voter registration records are removed from models relying on the difference-in-differences approach, along with their corresponding voter file records.

A second deviation lies in the decision to model race using the `wru` package in **R** instead of race estimates provided by Catalist, LLC.²⁴ The estimates of race provided by Catalist are aggregate estimates, and under the terms of the contract available to the researchers cannot be linked to individuals. As a result, accounting for multiply-matched RID records would not have been possible. However, the Catalist race model is built on principles of surname-plus-geography race modeling that form the core of peer reviewed academic research (Enos 2016; Elliott et al. 2008) and the `wru` package (Imai and Khanna 2016). Estimates conducted on a subset of matches using Catalist race information produce disparities similar to those found in Table 2.

²⁴<http://www.catalist.us>.

Coding Individual Race/Ethnicity in the Texas Voter File

As noted above and in the main text, we model the race of each individual in the Texas voter file using the `wru` package (Imai and Khanna 2016). To do so, we rely on the name and address information as listed in the voter file, specifically, the individual registrant's listed last name and the "Registration Address." We also incorporated information about the age of the registrant in 2010 (based on date of birth), and the sex of the registrant where listed in the file. Where information about the age or sex was not available, we relied on name and geography alone.

In order to determine the geography of the registrant, we geocoded the registration address in a multi-part address. We first relied on Open Street Map data, determining which addresses could be geocoded using the Open Street Map database to the Census block group level. Any addresses that could be associated with a single block group were considered correctly coded. Addresses that could not be matched with a block group, either due to address parsing issues or insufficient detail in the Open Street Map data, were geocoded using the Google Geocoding API.²⁵ Census tract information was obtained through the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) database.

The `wru` process relies on Census data regarding the distribution of racial/ethnic groups in the 2010 Census in order to generate geography-specific race estimates. The distribution of the Texas population changed between 2010 and 2016, in some cases substantially. Given this, and the uncertainty in the geocoding process, we relied on Census tract-level estimates of the racial/ethnic composition of a registrant's neighborhood. As Texas became more diverse over the period, and non-Hispanic Whites tend to live in the most homogeneous communities, we expect that our estimates of individual race are biased in the direction of producing false negatives for racial/ethnic minority status (type

²⁵A small share of addresses could not be parsed due to errors in the Texas voter file, consisting of most of the failed race codings indicated in the main text (<1% of all registrants). These cases were removed from our analysis.

II error, given our pre-registered hypotheses).

We rely on probabilistic estimates of race as produced by the `wru` package in our analysis. These measures allow us to average the race estimates for the approximately 5% of RID filers who match to multiple records in the voter file. Other work relies on a categorical definition of race/ethnicity, which better aligns with survey self-reports (Fraga 2018). Our main results do not change when assigning each registrant the “plurality” race prediction.

Racial/Ethnic Distribution Subsetting to RID-filing Counties

We reproduce Table 2 from the main text below, but excluding voters from counties where no RIDs were filed. While some of the percentages change slightly, the overall pattern is the same as in Table 2 and measures of statistical significance are similar as well.

Table A1: 2016 Voters by Race and ID Usage, Counties with RID Filers Only

	White	Black	Latinx	Asian	Other
<i>Voted with ID</i>	63.4%	11.5%	19.7%	3.6%	1.7%
<i>N</i>	5,548,275	1,006,384	1,726,760	315,892	151,043
<i>Voted without ID</i>	57.7%	16.1%	20.7%	2.9%	2.6%
<i>N</i>	8,409	2,353	3,014	418	383

Note: Includes individuals marked as having cast a non-provisional ballot in the Texas voter file, and residing in counties where at least one RID was filed. “Voted with ID” represents the percentage or number of voters who were not matched to Reasonable Impediment Declarations (RIDs). “Voted without ID” represents the percentage or number of voters who were matched to RIDs. Approximately 1% of RIDs have not been matched to voter file records, and are thus included in the “Voted with ID” category. Race could not be estimated for 0.7% of 2016 voters. These individuals are excluded from the above totals.

Reasons Cited, Subsetting by Race

We reproduce Figure 2 and Figure 3, tabulating cited reasons by race (White, Black, Latinx). As Figure A1 shows, the pattern of frequency for each cited impediment is similar to the overall pattern observed in Figure 2 for both Black and Latinx voters: a fairly similar proportion selected all categories except “lost/stolen” and “other.” While White voters were also more likely to choose these categories than any other, the response pattern for White voters displays less consistency across the other impediments.

Figure A1: Impediments Cited by Texas Voters in 2016, by Race





Figure A2: Impediments Cited by Texas Voters in 2016, by Race



With respect to the binned categories (Hardship, Relocation, and ID-Capable voters), Figure A1 demonstrates that the pattern in Figure 3 holds for white and black voters, but not for Latinx voters. Latinx voters were less likely to cite a relocation-related impediment, and were more likely to fall in the ID-Capable category.

Regression Models of Individual Response Categories

In the main text, we provide descriptive statistics of the impediment justifications provided by voters, finding that a large number of voters are recent movers or “ID-capable,” in that they previously had photo identification. We also note broad patterns of consistency across groups. However, most attention has focused on “hardship” impediments to possessing qualifying identification, such as cost or lacking necessary documents. We might also expect older voters to be more likely to cite illness or disability, or women to cite family obligations. Yet, these suppositions have not been verified.

To do so, we examine whether RID filers’ age, gender, and/or race is associated with the reasons they gave for lacking identification. whether certain voters are more likely to cite certain reasons. We ²⁶ This analysis yields insight into how enduring the impediments that voters face are, and also whether they are experienced disproportionately by voters from certain groups.

Here we present eight logistic regression models, in which the dependent variable is a binary indicator of affirmative response to seven impediment categories listed on the RID form: Lack of transportation or documents, work- or family-related reasons, a disability or illness, a lost or stolen ID, or an ID that has been applied for, but not received.

Table A2 contains coefficients and standard errors (clustered by county) from these models. The models return several significant results with respect to the seven RID checkbox categories.²⁷ For instance, women are less likely than men to cite work obligations as preventing them from obtaining an ID, but more likely than men to report family

²⁶Here, for RID filers who matched to multiple records in the Texas voter file, we take the average value of the voter file-linked variables (age, voter turnout, and modeled race/ethnicity) across all of the possible matches.

²⁷See Table A4 below for a substantively similar result using seemingly unrelated linear probability models.

Table A2: Logistic Regression Coefficients: Determinants of Choosing Various RID Categories

	Lacks Transportation	Lacks Documents	Work- Related Reasons	Lost Stolen	Disability/ Illness	Family- Related Reasons	Applied, Have Not Received
Voter's Age	-0.07* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.09* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	0.07* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Voter's Age ²	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Voter is a Woman	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.16* (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.42* (0.10)	-0.10 (0.08)
Voter is African-American	0.23 (0.17)	0.03 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.09)	0.35* (0.09)	0.32* (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.36* (0.12)
Voter is Latinx	0.27* (0.11)	0.07 (0.12)	-0.46* (0.10)	0.65* (0.10)	-0.29* (0.12)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.19 (0.11)
Voter is Asian-American	0.32 (0.20)	-0.18 (0.29)	0.42* (0.20)	-0.57* (0.15)	-1.21* (0.46)	0.09 (0.38)	0.06 (0.20)
Voter is Other (non-White) Race	0.31* (0.11)	-0.03 (0.16)	0.08 (0.14)	0.06 (0.10)	0.13 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.15)	0.40* (0.13)
Constant	-1.65* (0.15)	-2.40* (0.24)	-2.70* (0.22)	-2.14* (0.21)	-5.19* (0.30)	-3.38* (0.23)	-2.78* (0.18)
Number of Observations	14,625	14,625	14,625	14,625	14,625	14,625	14,625
Log Likelihood	-3,531	-3,707	-4,923	-8,378	-3,361	-2,334	-3,436
Wald Chi-Square	232.7	7.035	348.5	205.3	795.5	63.90	68.98

Note: * = $p < 0.05$. Standard errors clustered by county. For race indicators, "White" is the referent category. We omit petitions from this analysis for voters whose gender and/or race we could not determine.

obligations as an impediment. The age variable is also significant in four of the seven categories. Once age and age-squared are considered, the models show that older voters are more likely to report that work obligations impeded their ability to obtain ID, that they had lost their ID, and also that illnesses and/or disabilities prevented them from obtaining a photo ID. In contrast, older voters were less likely to cite a lack of transportation as impeding their ability to procure an ID.

With respect to race, Asian-Americans were significantly less likely than Whites to either report lost IDs or illness as a reason for lacking ID. The models also yield evidence that African-Americans filing RIDs were significantly more likely to report lost or stolen IDs, disabilities, or pending applications. Model 4 also suggests that Latinx voters were significantly more likely than Whites to cite lost/stolen IDs; notably, the effect

size for Latinx voters is approximately double that of African-Americans—a statistically significant difference.²⁸ Latinx voters differed from African-Americans however on the disability/illness measure; the former were significantly *less* likely than either Whites or African-Americans to report illness or disabilities. Latinx voters were also significantly less likely to cite work obligations, but were more likely than Whites (but not African-Americans) to cite a lack of transportation as the reason they lacked an ID.

Finally, we test for a relationship between voter demographics and the binned impediment reasons (relocation, hardship, or ID-capable) using logistic regression models. The dependent variable in these models is a binary indicator of whether a given voter’s response on the RID placed her in a given bin. The models include each voter’s age (and a squared age term) as independent variables, as well as indicators for race (the referent category is “White”) and whether the voter was a woman. While this analysis is mainly descriptive, it is informative with respect to policies that might alleviate the disenfranchising effects (if any) of strict voter ID laws. We therefore include this analysis to provide greater context in this area.

Table A3 contains the results of those models. These models suggest that older voters are less likely to report a hardship—and are more likely to have shown the ability to get an ID—than younger voters. Women are also more likely than men to be ID-capable, and less likely to report a hardship. While Asian-American voters are more likely than Whites to cite a recent relocation as the reason for lacking identification, both African-American and Latinx voters are less likely to fall into this category. That said, both African-American and Latinx voters are also more likely than Whites to be ID-capable.

²⁸Wald test, $p=0.0003$.

Table A3: Determinants of Falling Into Binned Categories

	Relocation- Related	Has Hardship	Is ID- Capable
Voter's Age	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.00)	0.06* (0.01)
Voter's Age ²	-0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Voter is a Woman	0.02 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)
Voter is African-American	-0.34* (0.08)	0.11 (0.07)	0.33* (0.09)
Voter is Latinx	-1.01* (0.09)	0.02 (0.07)	0.78* (0.10)
Voter is Asian-American	0.36* (0.12)	0.00 (0.09)	-0.35 (0.18)
Voter is Other (non-White) Race	-0.19 (0.12)	0.11 (0.06)	0.07 (0.10)
Constant	-0.39* (0.18)	-0.53* (0.11)	-2.18* (0.22)
Number of Observations	14,625	14,625	14,625
Log Likelihood	-8,314	-9,138	-8,840
Wald Chi-Square	608.6	144.3	179.9

Note: * = $p < 0.05$. Robust standard errors. For race indicators, "White" is the referent category. Voters who had "relocated" are those who marked the "Other" category and noted a recent move and/or student status. Voters who are "ID-capable" are those who claimed to have lost an ID, as well as those who chose "other" and wrote that they had forgotten their ID or were protesting the law. All other voters fall into the "hardship" category.

Seemingly Unrelated Regression Models

Since voters were able to cite more than one impediment on the RID form, there is a possibility that error terms are correlated across the models we report in Table A3 in the main paper, as well as in Appendix Table A2. In Tables A4 and A5, we therefore replicate those models in a seemingly unrelated regression framework. Because SUR models cannot be fit using logistic link functions, we specify the equations as linear probability

models. Generally, the results we report in the article replicate in the SUR specifications. There are three notable exceptions. The first is the finding in Table A4 that African Americans are more likely than whites to report a lack of transportation. In Table A2, this coefficient is positively signed, but does not achieve statistical significance. In Table A4, Latinx voters appear less likely than Whites to cite work- and disability-related impediments, whereas they are *more* likely to cite these impediments in Table A2.

We reproduce the binned models from Table A3 in Appendix Table A5. There are no meaningful differences between the logistic regression models reported in the former and the SUR models in the latter.

Table A4: Seemingly Unrelated Linear Probability Regression Coefficients: Determinants of Choosing Various RID Categories

	Lacks Transportation	Lacks Documents	Work- Related Reasons	Lost Stolen	Disability/ Illness	Family- Related Reasons	Applied, Have Not Received
Voter's Age	-0.01*	-0.00*	0.00*	0.01*	-0.00*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Voter's Age ²	0.00*	0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00*	0.00*	-0.00	-0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Voter is a Woman	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01*	0.01	-0.00	0.01*	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Voter is African-American	0.01*	0.00	-0.01	0.07*	0.02*	-0.00	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Voter is Latinx	0.02*	0.00	-0.04*	0.13*	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Voter is Asian-American	0.02	-0.01	0.06*	-0.08*	-0.03*	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Voter is Other (non-White) Race	0.02*	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.14*	0.08*	0.14*	0.06*	0.04*	0.04*	0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Number of Observations	14,625	14,625	14,625	14,625	14,625	14,625	14,625
R ²	.01	.00	.03	.03	.11	.00	.00

Note: * = $p < 0.05$. For race indicators, "White" is the referent category. We omit petitions from this analysis for voters whose gender and/or race we could not determine. Coefficients are derived from linear regressions of binary dependent variables; this model specification therefore allows for errors to be correlated across models of each dependent variable, but differs from the logistic specification presented in the main body of the article.

Table A5: Seemingly Unrelated Linear Probability Regression Coefficients: Determinants of Falling Into Binned Categories

	Relocation- Related	Has Hardship	Is I.D.- Capable
Voter's Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)
Voter's Age ²	-0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Voter is a Woman	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Voter is African-American	-0.07* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.07* (0.01)
Voter is Latinx	-0.18* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.17* (0.01)
Voter is Asian-American	0.09* (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
Voter is Other (non-White) Race	-0.04* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Constant	0.43* (0.02)	0.38* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Number of Observations	14,625	14,625	14,625
R ²	.06	.02	.04

Note: * = $p < 0.05$. For race indicators, "White" is the referent category. Voters who had "relocated" are those who marked the "Other" category and noted a recent move and/or student status. Voters with "hardships" listed family/work obligations, illness, financial constraints, religious reasons, or a lack of transportation, documents, or time. Voters who are "ID-capable" are those who claimed to have lost an ID or were awaiting one from the state, as well as those who chose "other" and wrote that they had forgotten their ID, were unaware of or were protesting the law, had recently relocated/were a student, had presented some form of ID that was not accepted (such as an expired ID), or claimed a legal impediment, such as a suspended driver's license. Coefficients are derived from linear regressions of binary dependent variables; this model specification therefore allows for errors to be correlated across models of each dependent variable, but differs from the logistic specification presented in the main body of the article.

Alternate Specification of County-Level Model

Because it is possible that some counties may not have allowed voters to file RIDs at all, in Table A6 we subset the analysis depicted in Table 5 to the 189 Texas counties reporting at least one RID. Though there are some differences with respect to statistical significance of some coefficients, the sign and substantive size of the coefficients—especially those in which we are particularly interested (Democratic vote, percent black, and percent Latinx) are similar.

Table A6: OLS Regression Coefficients: Determinants of County-Level RID Rates in Counties Filing at Least One RID

	Overall Rate	Relocation Rate	I.D.-Capable Rate	Hardship Rate
Perc. Obama, 2012	0.49* (0.14)	0.05 (0.04)	0.28* (0.10)	0.10* (0.05)
Perc. Black	-0.62* (0.22)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.35* (0.13)	-0.13* (0.06)
Perc. Latinx	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)
Perc. No College	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.15* (0.06)	0.19* (0.08)	-0.11* (0.05)
Perc. Aged 18-24	0.67 (0.45)	0.39 (0.22)	0.16 (0.16)	0.21* (0.09)
Perc. Aged 75+	0.88 (0.72)	0.36 (0.25)	0.21 (0.31)	0.60* (0.30)
Constant	0.01 (0.12)	0.09 (0.05)	-0.16* (0.07)	0.07 (0.04)
Number of Observations	189	189	189	189
R ²	0.21	0.15	0.24	0.15
F-Statistic	4.85	2.63	2.54	4.50
Root Mean Sq. Error	0.13	0.05	0.07	0.05

Note: * = $p < 0.05$. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Demographic information from U.S. Census 2015 5-year ACS estimates. "Perc. Obama" is Barack Obama's share of the county-level two-party vote. Voters who had "relocated" are those who marked the "Other" category and noted a recent move and/or student status. Voters who are "ID-capable" are those who claimed to have lost an ID, as well as those who chose "other" and wrote that they had forgotten their ID or were protesting the law. All other voters fall into the "hardship" category.